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lest he be constrained by anything distinct from his will. But it is hard to 
see how God can freely choose his nature unless he already has a determi-
nate nature—the very thing McCann is at great pains to rule out—mini-
mally; prior to his choosing, God must be such that, essentially, he is able 
to freely choose a (complete) nature. But, then it seems God is not solely 
responsible for his nature after all and McCann’s God is neither sovereign 
nor free. Perhaps, as I have suggested, the problem lies in his extreme 
conception of sovereignty. Perfection does not require it, and traditional 
theism can get by without it. All that is required for divine sovereignty is 
that no explanation trace through God to some more ultimate context. Why 
not understand God to be a substance, a fundamental unity that is the 
final explanation of all reality? If so, God is ultimate in terms of explana-
tion and control, hence as sovereign as can be. Regarding divine freedom, 
it is not clear that the above limitations would be of any real consequence: 
being “constrained” by one’s nature does not seem to be destructive of 
freedom. God is still the sole determiner of his action as creator, and his 
creative activity can still be understood as spontaneous and intentional, 
hence free, even if planned.
A final worry relates to McCann’s employment of perfect being theol-
ogy. A notorious problem for the perfect being theologian is how to judge 
between competing modal and value intuitions when erecting a conception 
of a perfect God. McCann’s more fine-grained intuitions can be challenged: 
contra McCann, some perfect being theologians think perfection entails 
necessary existence, and that God has the nature he has ontologically prior 
to his acting. Nor do all agree with McCann that perfection entails simplic-
ity, that timeless existence is the most perfect mode of existence, or that 
God always acts for a sufficient reason (the Principle of Sufficient Reason is 
not obviously intuitively true and may be false), or with complete sponta-
neity in creating. McCann may be right, but he is not obviously so, limiting 
his project’s overall appeal. My worries now stated, McCann’s book is a 
must read for those interested in God’s relationship to his creatures for the 
simple reason that he offers a solution that treats both seriously. 
Rationality and Religious Commitment, by Robert Audi. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2011. xvi + 311pp. $45 cloth.
JEFF JORDAN, University of Delaware
Among the prolific Robert Audi is a pace-setter with books and articles 
in epistemology, ethical theory, action theory, and sociopolitical philoso-
phy. With this book Audi explores issues clustered about the rationality of 
religious commitment, including the support which undergirds religious 
commitment and the challenges arising from the problem of evil and from 
naturalism. The book is organized into three broad parts, with the first 
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looking at epistemological concepts, including varieties of rationality, 
justification and knowledge. The second part explores the various dimen-
sions and landmarks of religious commitment, including the contours of 
faith, hope, belief and acceptance. The third examines objections to theistic 
commitment posed by the complexities of the theistic concept of God, the 
problem of evil, and the ruling idea of the age, philosophical naturalism.
By religious commitment Audi means more than theistic belief as he sees 
religious commitment encompassing attitudes, emotions, and behaviors 
the rationality of which are not identical with belief. The primary issue in 
this wide-ranging book concerns the rationality of a religious commitment 
of the sort commonly found among Christians, Jews, and Muslims. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, Audi holds that religious commitment can be rational, by 
which he means a globally rational person can hold a religious commit-
ment (23, 286–296). To say that religious commitment is rational says that 
it is consonant with reason; it harmonizes with reason (7). Moreover, Audi 
holds that a failure of the intellectual support of a religious commitment 
may not entail a corresponding failure of the religious behavior flowing 
out of that commitment, if the behavior enjoys adequate non-religious 
grounds (90–91). Religious behavior may be rational, Audi holds, even if 
there are no good religious grounds supporting that behavior. One would 
not be amiss in taking this book as a considered and detailed response to 
the rash charges of Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens and Sam 
Harris (a.k.a. the “new atheists”), that breathlessly allege deep delusion 
and irrationality of the religious. As Audi puts it, “a religiously committed 
life, then, can be rational” (288).
He arrives at this result with arguments carrying considerable inter-
est, including a rejection of middle knowledge (223–224, 227), an enter-
tainment that satisficing may be rational (227, note 21), a rejection of the 
incompatibility of gratuitous evil and the existence of God (229, 231), an 
argument that practical considerations cannot provide reason for belief 
(13), and a novel approach to the problem of evil which Audi claims is 
a “theocentric” approach as opposed to a “cosmocentric” approach. As 
Audi puts it, “The common approach is to look at the creation and ask 
whether it is good enough to be created by God. My approach is to focus 
on God, and then ask whether creating and experiencing the universe is 
good enough for God” (215, emphases in original). The idea of the theo-
centric approach is that the aggregate value of a particular possible world 
should include not only the value of the created parts of the world but also 
the value of divine experiences which are “incalculably great” (217).
Regarding this last result, there may be a tension between the ideas that 
God could bring about a world less than the best he could have brought 
about, and that the divine experiences themselves are “incalculably great.” 
One can imagine a critic claiming that the divine experiences of love and 
reconciliation may well be valuable and of a magnitude so great as to re-
sist calculation, but, even so, those experiences provide insufficient reason 
for a perfectly benevolent and altruistic being to prefer a situation of more 
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creaturely suffering over one with less creaturely suffering no matter the 
value of the creator’s experiences.
Audi’s argument for the compatibility of God and gratuitous evil rests 
in part on the idea that particular instances of suffering are not strictly 
necessary as constituents of a single possible best of all possible worlds 
which a perfect being would create (228–229). As Audi puts it, “for even if 
the worlds God would regard as choiceworthy contain beings relevantly 
like me, they would not have to contain me in particular to realize an ex-
actly similar good. Thus, it is not true that there can be no gratuitous evil 
in a world created by an omnicompetent being” (229). A resentable evil, 
Audi thinks, may be incompatible with God’s existence even if gratuitous 
evils are compatible. A resentable evil is any the deletion of which would 
result in a divinely preferable alternative world. Because he holds that 
God’s existence is compatible with gratuitous evil, Audi holds that the 
standard version of the evidential argument (basically Rowe’s first version 
of the evidential argument) is unsound with a false premise. Could the 
atheologian rehabilitate the evidential argument by employing the con-
cept of resentable evil rather than that of gratuitous evil? It is not clear, as 
Audi says little about resentable evil (see pages 230 and 231 for what little 
Audi says about resentable evils). In any case, this is a research question 
best left for another occasion.
Like many today, Audi erects much of his philosophical theology upon a 
foundation of universalist divine love—God loves all humans to the same 
deep and significant degree (see, for instance, pages 180, 155, 151–152). 
This love flows, according to Audi, out of the “integration of omniscience 
with perfect goodness” (193). But what if it is not possible in-principle to 
love every person to the same significant degree? What if, that is, it is not 
possible to love maximally and equally? As far as I can see, much if not all 
of Audi’s theological superstructure could rest on a foundation more in 
line with the sorts of claims found about the partiality of the divine love 
in the Hebrew scriptures (God loves a particular people) or found in the 
distinctive Christian scriptures (God loves elected individuals). Why think 
that the claims of universalist divine love are a muddle? Well, different 
people have different interests. And, if we hold that love has as a necessary 
constituent identifying with the interests of one’s beloved, then there will 
be an in-principle obstacle, as no one can knowingly and rationally take as 
his own incompatible interests. We might understand identifying with as, 
roughly, caring about what one’s beloved cares about because one’s beloved 
cares about it. In response, one might suggest distinguishing between best 
interests and mere interests, with the former as the relevant consideration, 
so one might seek to pare the stock of best interests persons have down to 
a compossible few (roughly, caring about what one’s beloved should care 
about). Even with this distinction, we find an obstacle still as whatever 
compatibility this paring provides is achieved at the cost of plausibility. If 
God loves individuals as regards their particularity and singularity, and 
not just as bearers of universal features, then advancing or identifying with 
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a thinned set of best interests found among all hardly seems a sufficient fit. 
And in any case, if divine love relevantly resembles even if it far surpasses 
the love characteristic of the best of human parenting, then simply meet-
ing only those interests of a beloved child which are interchangeable with 
those of any other child falls short of the mark. Human parenting at its best 
involves not just caring about what one’s child should care about, but also 
caring about what one’s child cares about. Our beloveds and their cares are 
not fungible matters.
On a different score, Audi claims that “no practical considerations are, 
properly speaking, reasons for believing. I may have an eminently ratio-
nal desire to please Aline and know that I would do so by believing that 
she sings like Maria Callas (since she would discover my believing it). But 
this desire-belief combination is not a reason to believe that. It may give 
me a reason to cause myself to believe it; but that is a reason for action 
related to this proposition, not for believing it” (13). Practical consider-
ations, then, provide reason for actions, and forming a belief may be an 
action, but believing is not. So practical considerations can provide reason 
for acting as if a proposition, call it p, were true, but do not provide reason 
for believing p, Audi holds. So, one can rationally act on p, and rationally 
employ it as a premise in her practical deliberations on the basis of practi-
cal considerations, but one cannot rationally believe that p on the basis of 
practical considerations.
While this is not a major philosophical point, still there is an air of 
oddness wafting about allowing practical reasons for acting as if p were 
true and yet excluding practical considerations as reasons for believing p. 
What is the source of this oddness? It is, in part, this: if one is practically 
justified in the production of something, then, it seems, one is practically 
justified as regards the product. That is, in the normal causal run of events, 
acting as if p were true, often or habitually, results in one believing that 
p is true. Now, combine this psychological or causal observation with the 
principles that:
A: for any person S, actions α, and events e, if S is practically justified in 
doing α, and if doing α foreseeably brings about e, then S is practically 
justified in bringing about e.
And:
B: for any person S and events e, if S is practically justified in bringing 
about e, then S is practically justified in e’s obtaining.
If (A) and (B) are plausible, then by allowing practical considerations to 
motivate belief-formation, the divide between practically justified belief-
formation and practically justified belief is lost. Practical considerations 
can provide reasons for belief as well as belief-formation if (A) and (B) 
are true. Practical considerations cannot provide epistemic or evidentiary 
reasons, yet they provide reasons nonetheless. One can form a belief be-
cause of a practical reason and hold that same belief because of a practical 
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reason (contra p. 128). But perhaps one might contend that practical con-
siderations are relevant for actions and not dispositions or states, and be-
lieving something is not an action. Maybe so, but maintaining a belief is 
an action, and if practical considerations can motivate or rationalize pre-
serving or maintaining or holding a particular belief, as well as forming 
it, then it does not seem in error to hold that practical considerations can 
provide reasons in support of belief (maintaining it) even if they cannot 
provide evidence for thinking the belief is true. Now perhaps an Audite 
might deny principle (A) or (B) or deny that acting as if p normally results 
in believing that p. But as with the issue of resentable evil, these are issues 
best left for others.
All in all, Audi has written a philosophically provocative and insight-
ful book. Its audience should extend beyond those who specialize in the 
philosophy of religion to include any with an interest in the viability of 
religious commitment in a time and culture dominated by philosophical 
naturalism.
